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Defining Democracy: The Supreme Court's
Campaign Finance Dilemma
LORI RINGHAND*

INTRODUCTION

On December I0, 2003 the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in McConnell v. FEC.' In McConnell, the Court was asked to
determine the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA"). A divided Court, in a deeply fractured decision in which six
justices wrote individual opinions, upheld the major provisions of the
legislation.' Yet despite the almost 300 pages of reasoning provided by
the Court, and a voluminous record developed by the district court, the
Justices could not agree on what purportedly is the central issue in
campaign finance law: whether the challenged regulations were
necessary to combat political corruption or the appearance of such
corruption.3 Why is this question so hard for courts to resolve? The
answer, I believe, rests in what I have called the judiciary's "democracydefining dilemma."
Democratic self-government can be defined and structured in many
different ways.4 Consequently, in a democratic system of government,
there are actually two types of political questions that must be answered.
There are the day-to-day questions of policy preferences: Do I support
tougher environmental regulations or do I believe such regulations
would result in an unacceptable loss of jobs? Should my school district
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, Oxford University, BCL
University of Wisconsin Law School, J.D. 1997. This article would not have been possible
without the patient review and thoughtful comments provided by Professor Richard L. Hasen,
Professor Jane Schacter, the UK College of Law Junior Faculty Consortium, the UK Randall-Park
Colloquium, and Professors Louise M. Graham, Kathryn L. Moore and Robert G. Schwemm. I also
would like to thank Nicola Prall and Michael Odell Walker for their diligent research assistance, and
Dan Lorentz for his support and suggestions.
I. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id at 98-io2. Likewise, the district court, in an opinion supported by a voluminous record, did
not make a single finding of fact regarding whether the behavior evidenced by the record constituted
corruption. See McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003).
4. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1602-03 (1999)
[hereinafter Cain, Garrett's Temptation].
2001;
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raise local taxes to increase teacher salaries? Who do I want to be my
Senator? But antecedent to those questions is a group of more
fundamental questions, questions about what kind of democracy we live
in. These questions involve regulation of the political process through
which the day-to-day policy questions are decided: Should political party
primaries be open to all voters or only registered party members?56
Should corporations be able to make donations to political campaigns?
Do hanging chads count?7
These "political process" questions have substantive consequences.
Opening political party primaries may give more voters an earlier voice
in elections, but it also may reduce the power of political parties.
Allowing corporations to make campaign contributions may increase the
quantity of political speech available to voters, but could decrease the
ability of individuals to influence election outcomes. And of course,
deciding how to count hanging chads can determine the outcome of a
presidential election. These questions also, however, raise deep and
important questions about how we view democracy itself. For example, is
democracy better served by a strong two-party system, or by a system in
which minor parties and individuals have greater influence? By a system
of unregulated political spending, or by one that attempts to equalize the
influence of a variety of speakers?8 These types of questions routinely
lurk just beneath the surface of the courts' political process cases.
In recent years, the courts have been asked to resolve an increasing
number of these cases,9 and the cases themselves have raised increasingly
important issues.'I This has led to a lively debate within legal scholarship:
when presented with a challenge to the way the government has
regulated the political process, what posture should a court assume?"
Should it be deferential to the political choices made by elected officials,
or should it vigorously intercede to protect the rights asserted by those

5. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (i99o); Fed. Elections Comm'n
v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
7. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120 (2oo0).
& See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 652; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
9. Cases involving regulation of the political process have become increasingly common. See
RicHARD L.HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 3 (2003) (documenting by decade an
increase in the Supreme Court's election law cases) [hereinafter HASEN, ThE SUPREME COURT]; Pamela
S. Karlan, Eit Strategies in ConstitutionalLaw. Lessons for Getting the Least Dangerous Branch Out
of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 672 (2002) (observing that a substantial share of the
Supreme Court's docket consists of cases involving the regulation of politics).
io. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 98.
ii. See, e.g., HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT, supranote 9; Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political
Competition,85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (i999) [hereinafter Pildes, PoliticalCompetition];Frederick Schauer,
JudicialReview of the Devices of Democracy,94 Coutm. L. REv. 1326 (1994).
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who claim they are injured by those choices?" Who, in other words,
should have primary authority over determining what the ground-rules
of democracy are?
A commonly heard answer is that these democracy-defining tasks
should be left to the political branches, constrained only by the
limitations on legislative choices imposed by the Constitution itself.'3 This
division of duties -legislative structuring of democratic procedures,
constrained by judicial protection of rights -is consistent with the formal
division of labor between courts and legislatures that our legal system
rests on. But, it is inherently unworkable in campaign finance cases.
It is of course hardly extraordinary to assert that where the
boundary between these duties is-where policy options end and rights
protection begins-is difficult to ascertain and frequently contested.'4 I
am claiming more than that here. I argue here that, at least in campaign
finance cases, the rights the judiciary is charged with protecting cannot
themselves be defined (and thereby protected) without judicial reliance
on some underlying vision of what democracy itself should look like.
Consequently, it is not the Constitution that is restraining legislative
experimentation in these cases, but the judges' own, usually
unchallenged and undefended, ideas about what they think democratic

12. For a discussion of this issue, see Schauer, supra note ii. Schauer poses the question as one of
how courts should approach the fundamental questions of self-governance raised when legislatures
attempt to regulate the ground rules of democracy itself. The conflict, as Schauer sees it, is between a
democratically inspired and a constitutionally inspired view of self-government. Id at 1337-38. Under
the "democratically-inspired" view, making decisions about what democracy is is an essential part of
self-government. Id at 1337. Therefore, the judiciary must refrain from defining democracy because
self-government must entail decisions about self-government. Id. Under the opposing
"constitutionally-inspired view," judges must strictly review legislation regulating the political process
to ensure that self-interested political actors are not insulating or entrenching their own power. Id.
Schauer's paradigm, of course, invokes the broader dispute about the proper role of judicial review in
a democratic system Id at 1340. For a sampling of this debate, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMocRAcY AND
DisTnusT (1980) (arguing that the judiciary must intervene to protect the integrity of the political
process); MARK TusHNET, TAXING THE CONSTrtUON AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREMENr (I9)
(arguing that self-government loses much of its value when

citizens are prevented from making decisions about how to shape democracy itself).
13. See generally Lillian R BeVier, Where is the Center of Democracy? A Reply to Professor
Neuborne, 93 Nw. U. L REv. 1075, zo79 (1999); Cain, Garrett's Temptation, supranote 4; Kathleen M
Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAvis L REV. 663, 672-73 (1997)
[hereinafter Sullivan, PoliticalMoney]. Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens have made the same point
in relation to voting rights cases. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (arguing that the
Court's vote dilution cases require the federal courts to "dabble" in political theory and
inappropriately forces the courts to choose among competing bases of representation and competing
theories of political philosophy) (Thomas, J., concurring); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S.
567, 598 ("It is not this Court's constitutional function to choose between the competing visions of
what makes democracy work .... ) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. For a variety of approaches to this issue, see RICHARD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
('977); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REv. 343
(i993); Barry Friedman, Dialogueand JudicialReview, 91 MicH. L. REv. 577 ('993).
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self-government should look like. This is what I will call the judiciary's
"democracy-defining dilemma": courts deciding campaign finance cases
cannot protect rights in those cases without also defining democracy.
Unfortunately, judges have not confronted this problem. The
corruption-based analytical methodology developed by the Supreme
Court in Buckley v. Valeo 15 , and still used to decide campaign finance
cases today, hides the democracy-defining dilemma in the superficially
democracy-neutral language of rights protection. This methodology has
allowed judges deciding campaign finance cases to deny their democracydefining role.
The judiciary's failure to recognize and address the democracydefining dilemma has had at least three important consequences. First,
judges deciding campaign finance cases have been able to rest important
decisions on unchallenged definitions of democracy that in fact are
deeply contested and controversial. Moreover, they have been able to do
this without persuasively demonstrating, or often even arguing, that their
preferred definition of democracy is in any way constitutionally
compelled. Second, judicial reliance on unstated, disputed and often
shifting assumptions about democracy has resulted in a body of campaign
finance case law that lacks both clarity and coherence. Finally, the
judicial failure to confront the democracy-defining dilemma has
deflected debate from what should be the primary question in campaign
finance cases: Is the definition of democracy the Court is relying on in
defining the constitutional right at issue mandatedby the Constitution? If
not, then there is unlikely to be any independently ascertainable rightsbased rationale for striking down the legislation.
This article has five parts. In Part I, I explain the analytical
methodology developed by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, and
discuss how that methodology embodies the judiciary's democracydefining dilemma. In Part II, I discuss how the Court's post-Buckley, preMcConnell cases have perpetrated the problem by shifting the focus of
campaign finance cases to the meaning of "corruption." In Part III, I
discuss the McConnell decision itself, and show how the deferential
posture adopted by the Court in that case does not resolve the
democracy-defining dilemma. In Part IV, I examine the role of the
defining democracy dilemma in other political process cases. Finally, in
Part V, I outline a new judicial decision-making methodology, one that is
conscious of and attempts to manage the democracy-defining dilemma. I
conclude that, while the democracy-defining dilemma is unavoidable in
our legal system, a different methodology can help manage the most
undesirable consequences of the dilemma, and can thereby create a
genuine "space" for non-judicial participation in defining the democracy
15. 424 U.S. I (1976).
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in which we live.
I.

A.

THE PROBLEMATIC BUCKLEY PARADIGM

THE BUCKLEY DECISION

Any discussion of the Supreme Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence must begin with an understanding of the problematic
paradigm developed by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo. But examining
Buckley at this juncture also is useful for two additional reasons. First,
Buckley illustrates just how much of the debate over campaign finance
regulation actually rests on an underlying debate about what an ideal
democracy should look like. Second, Buckley begins to illuminate the
Court's democracy-defining dlemma by showing how those underlying
ideas about democracy are interwoven with the Court's decisions about
rights.
. Buckley involved a First Amendment challenge to the Federal
Election Campaign Act ("FECA"). FECA required public disclosure of
campaign contributions of more than $ioo and disclosure of campaign
expenditures greater than $iooo. 6 In 1974, Congress amended FECA,
broadly defining the term "contributions" and imposing new expenditure
and contribution limits on candidates, committees, and "unassociated"
(independent) individuals and entities.'7 The 1974 amendments also
included new disclosure requirements, and provided8 public funding to
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates.
The Buckley plaintiffs challenged each of these provisions.'9 The
Court upheld the limits on campaign contributions, but struck down the
overall expenditure limits and the limits on independent expenditures.'
The analytical method used by the Court to evaluate both the
expenditure and the contribution limits was the standard First
Amendment methodology of balancing the asserted free speech interests
against the government's claimed need to regulate the speech at issue.'
The individual free speech interests asserted in Buckley included the
ability to make a political statement by contributing to a campaign on the
i6. Id. at i.
17. Id. at62-63.
i& Id. at 62-64, 87-9o.
19. As many Buckley commentators have noted, money is not speech. It therefore is not selfevident that the Buckley court needed to treat the spending of money on speech as deserving of much
First Amendment protection at all. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral
Exceptionalism and the FirstAmendment, 77 TEx. L REv. 18o3, 182o-2I (1999). For an argument that
the Court was right to do so, see Sullivan, Political Money, supra note 13, at 678. For the classic
statement of the opposite view, see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:Is Money Speech?,

85 YALE L.J. Ioot (1976).

2o. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35-39. Independent expenditures are expenditures made independently
of a candidate or political party.
21. Id. at 64-75.
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contribution side, and, on the expenditure side, the ability to influence

elections by engaging in political speech. " The asserted government
interests, offered in support of both the contribution and the expenditure

limits, were to equalize political influence among citizens and to prevent
"corruption or the appearance of corruption" of the political process. 3

The Buckley Court held that preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption was a compelling government interest
justifying restrictions on speech, but equalizing the relative ability of all

citizens to affect electoral outcomes was not.4 The Court then upheld the

restrictions on campaign contributions, reasoning that those limits helped

prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption. 5

The Court, however, struck down the restrictions on campaign

expenditures 6 Expenditure restrictions, the Court said, were not
sufficiently related to the government's interest in controlling quid pro

quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption, nor could they be
justified by the equalization interest the Court had found insufficiently
compelling. 7
The Buckley Court therefore attached different constitutional

significance to the two government interests asserted in that casepreventing political corruption and promoting political equality. The

Court's disparate treatment of these two interests helps illustrate the first
lesson to be culled from Buckley: just how much the campaign finance
debate rests on a deeper conflict between competing visions of
democracy itself. This conflict can be shown most starkly by examining

two of the most prominent visions of democracy, pluralism and civic
republicanism.

8

These competing visions of democracy present quite

Id. at 24, 75.
Id. at 26,45.
24. Id. at 29,39.
25. Id. at 26-27.
26. Id. at 39.
27. Id. at 45, 47.
28. There are many viable definitions of democracy other than pluralism and civic republicanism.
In the United States, however, these two visions-the self-interested bartering of pluralism and the
informed, good-faith search for a common good of civic republicanism (and its cousin, deliberative
democracy) -have together shaped the parameters of much of our public debate about the meaning of
democracy. It therefore is useful to consider the Court's democracy-defining dilemma within the
framework of these two broadly sketched, paradigmatic definitions. There also are many different
strands within both pluralist and civic republican thought. I do not attempt to distinguish or identify
these strands here. For a general introduction to pluralism, see ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATiC THEORY (1956). For a general introduction to civic republicanism, see Cass R_ Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1547--58, 1564-76 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]. For a discussion of how both pluralist and
civic republican thinking has influenced law, see Morton J. Horwitz, Forward The Constitution of
Change Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, io 7 HARv. L. REV. 30, 58-65 (i993); Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword Traces of Self-Government, ioo HARv. L. REV. 4, i7-60 (1986); Kathleen M.
22.

23.
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different ideas about what ideal democracy should look like. Those
differences, in turn, frame some of the most important and difficult issues
raised in the campaign finance debate.
B.

BUCKLEY, PLURALISM, AND

CIvic REPUBLICANISM

To a pluralist, democracy is a battle between interest groups.
Interest groups compete, barter, and bargain in the political marketplace
in order to obtain for themselves the best possible package of goods and
services.' The role of elected officials in a democracy, pluralists argue, is
to capture the underlying citizen preferences evidenced in these interest
group bargains and enact them into public policy.3" "Fair" policy,

therefore, is policy that accurately reflects the interests and trade-offs
made by competing, self-interested groups." Consequently, under the
pluralist view, campaign finance regulations must be measured by their
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) in facilitating this. Thus, to the extent
that interest group activity in political campaigns reflects or informs
citizen preferences, campaign finance regulations attempting to hamper
that activity are, to a pluralist, fundamentally misguided.
Civic republicans reject the pluralist view of democracy as ideally
comprised of battles and bargains among self-interested groups." To the
civic republican, civic virtue, not just individual or group self-interest,
should play a role in democratic self-government.33 Thus, civic
republicans believe that the purpose of politics is not to aggregate private
preferences or to facilitate interest-group bargaining, but to create public
consensus through deliberative discussion.' Ideal democracy, to the civic
republican, consists of deliberative debate about public issues, conducted
in the context of political equality and respect.35 To civic republicans, the
type of interest group bargaining applauded by pluralists distorts
democracy by discouraging open-minded, good-faith deliberation, and
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1713 (988) [hereinafter Sullivan, Rainbow
Republicanism]. For a discussion of the pluralist underpinnings of the public choice movement, see
Mark Kelnian, On Democracy-Bashing:A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice
of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. I99, 201 (1988).
29. See Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism,supranote 28, at i542; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra
note 28, at 32-33.
30. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 784, 838-41 (1985) (discussing DAVID TRuMAN, THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS (2d ed. i97i))
[hereinafter Lowenstein, PoliticalBribery].
31. See Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. C. LEGAL
F. III, 122-23 (1995).

32. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 28, at 1549-50.
33. Id at 1550.
34. Id. at 1548-49.

35. Id. at 1548. For a critique of the civic republican approach to campaign finance regulation, see
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradoxof Campaign FinanceReform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 898-9oi
(1998) [hereinafter Ortiz, DemocraticParadox].
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reducing incentives for dialogue and consensus building. 36 Civic
republicans, therefore, support campaign finance regulations that reduce
the effectiveness of interest groups, raise the quality of political debate,
and promote political equality.37
This conflict between the pluralist and the civic republican views of
democracy does not explain all of the important issues raised in debates
about campaign financing. There is, for example, an important dispute
among pluralists themselves about the appropriate role of money in

interest group politics. 3" However, many of the issues raised in the
campaign finance debate relate to underlying questions about the nature
of democracy itself.39 Some of the most vexing questions raised in that
debate-for example, whether the responsiveness of elected officials to
interests groups is a good or a bad thing, whether extensive spending on
political advertising enhances or distorts political debate, and whether

political equality is violated when different people can spend different
amounts of money promoting their political agendas-are vexing at least
in part because they force us to confront the unresolved tensions in these
two very different views of what democracy itself should be-of how
36. Sunstein, Beyond the RepublicanRevival, supra note 28, at 1543-48.
37. Id. at 1552-54. Civic republicans define political equality as the equal access of all individuals
and groups to the political process. Id. at 1552. Political equality, however, is notoriously difficult to
define. See Bruce E. Cain, Cheap Talk Citizenship: The Democratic Implications of Voting with
Dollars,37 U. RICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (2003); Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different? 77 TEx. L. REv. 16o9
(1999); Lori A. Ringhand, Concepts of Equality in British Election Financing Reform Proposals, 22
OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (2002); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance
Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1371-75, 1382-87 (1994).
38. The difficulty in defining political equality has caused a split in pluralist thinking itself.
Pluralists differ on whether the unequal ability of citizens to spend money in the pluralist political
marketplace corrupts the outcome of that market. See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 28. "Proreform" pluralists believe than an unequal ability to spend money on politics (i) exists and (2) matters;
"anti-reform" pluralists disagree. The former group of pluralist thinkers will favor some campaign
finance regulations, but only those that attempt to enable more people to play the interest-group
game. The latter group, who believe either that the ability to raise or spend money in politics is not an
unreliable way of measuring citizen preferences, or that the role of money in determining interest
group preferences is ultimately not important, will not favor any reform attempting to reduce the
impact of money on the political process, and in fact will probably favor rolling back existing
regulations that do nothing more than target actual quid pro quo corruption. Neither type of pluralist,
however, will support regulation aimed at reducing the influence of interest group competition on
political decisions. See also Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root Of All
Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HoiRsn L. REv. 301, 340-42 (1989) (discussing the campaign finance debate
as a "reflection of two competing visions of the government's fights and obligations regarding the
political process....") [hereinafter Lowenstein, The Root of All Evil]; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged
and the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REv. I, 18-26
(1995) (discussing the academic debate over campaign finace reform) [hereinafter Ortiz, The Engaged
and the Inert].
39. See Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of American
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1351 (1994); see also Lowenstein, PoliticalBribery, supra
note 3o, at 827 (noting that opponents of campaign finance regulation often identify with the pluralist
school of thought); Lowenstein, The Root Of All Evil, supra note 38, at 340-42.
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democracy should be defined. 0
The influence of this unresolved tension between pluralism and civic
republicanism is evident in Buckley. In Buckley, the Court found that
prohibiting the appearance or actuality of quid pro quo-type corruption
was a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to justify restrictions

on political speech. 4' Equalizing the ability of groups or individuals to
participate in the public debate by limiting campaign expenditures,

however, was not.' By accepting the government's corruption rationale
while denying the government's equalization rationale, the Buckley
Court implicitly endorsed a pluralist-inspired view of democracy. 43 To

the Court, protecting a pluralistic political process by regulating things
like quid pro quo bribery, which potentially interfere with an elected
official's duty to vote in accordance with pluralist preferences, is
constitutionally acceptable. But regulating overall political expenditures
in order to promote the civic republican ideals of political equality and
public deliberation is constitutionally unacceptable. The Buckley Court's
choice to validate the government's claimed anti-corruption interest
while rejecting its political equalization interest was, therefore, a choice
with deep (albeit perhaps unexamined) roots in the debate between
pluralism and civic republicanism, and the related judicial assumptions
about what a "good" or properly functioning democracy requires.' By
incorporating these assumptions into constitutional law, the Court
effectively substituted its preferred view of democracy for that preferred
by Congress when it enacted the FECA amendments.4'
40. For an interpretation that mandates a reading of the First Amendment that protects civic
republican-type equality, participation, and deliberation, see for example, OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY
OF FREE SPEECH (1996).
41. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 26 (1996).
42. Id at 54.
43. I am not arguing that the Supreme Court has consistently embraced any particular vision of
democracy. For a discussion of how the Court has not done so, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, The
Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-And Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245 (David K. Ryden ed., 2ooo). I am instead arguing that courts
cannot define rights in these cases without relying on some vision of democracy. In Buckley, that vision
happened to be quite pluralistic.
44. For a broader discussion of this issue, see J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of
Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 6o9, 631-42
(1982). I do not argue that the Supreme Court justices make a particularly thought-out or intentional
choice to constitutionalize their particular views of democracy as such. The Court, in fact, has
indicated an aversion to doing precisely that. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901-02 (1994) (Thomas,
J., concurring). I do, however, argue that the effect of judicial reasoning in these cases is just such a
constitutionalization. As I discuss in Part V, below, the ad hoc, unexamined nature of the justices'
adoption of their preferred vision of democracy further aggravates the democracy-defining dilemma.
45. The lower court that heard the Buckley case shared Congress's view and cast the FECA
legislation as an effort to protect the integrity of the political process:
By reducing in good measure disparity due to wealth, the Act tends to equalize both the
relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes, and the opportunity of all
interested citizens to become candidates for elective federal office. This broadens the choice
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The Court, however, did not justify its decision in those terms.
Instead, it said that the Constitution itself-the First Amendmentdictated the Buckley outcome 6 If that is so, then the democracy-defining
dilemma is not really a dilemma for the Court at all: if the Constitution
compels the outcome reached by the Buckley Court, then the Court is
not inappropriately substituting its preferred vision of democracy for that
preferred by the legislature, but rather is merely engaging in its
appropriate and proper rights-protection role. This raises our second
question: what does Buckley tell us about the relationship between
constitutional rights and judicial decisions about democracy?

C.

BUCKLEY AND THE DEMOCRACY-DEFINING DILEMMA

I asserted earlier in this Article that in campaign finance cases, the
dual tasks of protecting rights and defining democracy are inextricably
interwoven, and that a judge therefore cannot define the scope of the
First Amendment right at issue without first relying on a baseline
definition of democracy. Thus, I claimed that it is the judge's definition
of democracy that determines the scope of the right at issue, not the right

itself that acts as an independently ascertainable constraint on the
legislature's democracy-defining choices.
Buckley illustrates this point. The First Amendment balancing test
used by the Court in Buckley asks whether the claimed government
interest in regulating the speech at issue is sufficiently compelling to

justify overriding the free speech interests claimed by the individual
challenging the law. 4 Applying this test requires the Court to evaluate
of candidates and the opportunity to hear a variety of views.
... The corrosive influence of money blights our democratic processes. We have not been
sufficiently vigilant; we have failed to remind ourselves, as we moved from the town halls to
today's quadrennial Romanesque political extravagances, that politics is neither an end in
itself nor a means for subverting the will of the people .... the present situation cannot be
tolerated by a government that professes to be a democracy.
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841-42, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The lower court thus saw democracy as

an arena in which all citizens can gather to discuss and influence politics. Money "blights" democracy
and deprives citizens of their equal opportunity to "affect electoral outcomes." While these are not
exclusively civic republican terms, the district court's vision of democracy is decidedly less pluralistic
-less a battle of interest groups and more a deliberation among equals-than the Supreme Court's.
Judge J. Skelly Wright, who sat on the lower court that decided Buckley and who is presumed to be
the author of that court's per curium opinion, has noted and disagreed with the pluralist underpinnings
of the Supreme Court opinion. See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:Is Money Speech?,
supra note i9, at 1013-19.
46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23.

47. Id. at 15-16. Frederick Schauer and Richard Pildes have argued that there really is not any
"standard" First Amendment analytical methodology, and that the Court actually applies somewhat
different tests depending on the type of speech being regulated. See generally Schauer & Pildes, supra
note 19. Schauer and Pildes develop this argument in the context of advocating for their position that
the First Amendment should be read in light of the structural goals embedded in it. Id. at 1814; see also
infra Part III. Judicial balancing of individual and state interest is, nonetheless, the methodology the
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the legitimacy and strength of the government's asserted interest and

then weigh (balance) that interest against the alleged intrusion on the
challenger's First Amendment speech rights. In many areas, the Court
can do this without reference to any underlying principles about how
democracy should be structured. 4" But in campaign finance cases it

cannot. In these cases, the government's asserted interest is its perceived
need to shape the political process itself.49 Evaluating the importance of
such an interest necessarily requires judges to resort to some background

theory of democracy: a judge cannot determine what weight to give the
government's asserted interest in protecting or enhancing the political

process without some background vision of what that process should
ideally look like-without some baseline vision of democracy from which
to evaluate whether the government's reason for acting is "good
enough." Thus, a judge deciding a campaign finance case cannot define
the scope of the claimed First Amendment right he or she is charged with

protecting without first embracing a particular vision of democracy.
This interdependent relationship between the dual tasks of defining

the substantive scope of rights and evaluating the government's reasons
for regulating conduct implicating those rights has been noted in other

contexts." The problem is perhaps particularly acute when courts are
asked to give substantive content to highly generalized rights (e.g. the
right to free speech). The more abstractly worded a right is, the more
Court has articulated in its campaign finance cases. See Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 788--9
(1983) (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (I974)). For a discussion of the Court's use of
balancing tests in political process cases more generally, see Daniel R- Lowenstein, Associational
Rights of Major PoliticalParties:A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 Tex. L Rev. 1741, 1742 ('993). For a critique
of the "compelling state interest" terminology from a different perspective, see Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L REV. 2417,
2417-24 (1996).
48. For example, the balancing of interests done by courts in pornography cases probably does
not require judicial reference to competing visions of democracy itself (except perhaps in the macro
sense that any invocation of judicial review raises questions of self-government).
49. For a brief discussion of this point, see Schauer & Pildes, supra note i9 (observing that
promoting a "fairer" mode of representation, enhancing political deliberation, and improving voter
decision-making are among the more common rationales offered for various campaign finance
regulations). Frank Sorauf also has noted that applying the compelling interest test in campaign
finance cases raises basic questions about the nature of democracy. Sorauf, supra note 39, at 1351.
.
50 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 14; Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional
Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. I8 (1993). Pamela Karlan has demonstrated the presence of a
baseline problem in some political process cases. In her work, she examines how the Court often has
unquestioningly used the status quo as a de facto constitutional baseline from which it measures
legislative efforts. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics?Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995
Term, 34 Hous. L. REv. 289 (I997). She also has noted that the Court's "racial gerrymandering" can be
explained only in reference to the Court's underlying vision of what our democracy should look like.
See Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in ConstitutionalLaw: Lessons for Getting the Least Dangerous
Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 671-72 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing
Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection From Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 1345, 1352-54 (2OO).
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difficult it is to judicially determine the concrete scope of the right in
actual cases. It is, for example, much easier to interpret and apply the
constitutional provision requiring the president to be a natural-born
resident at least 35 years of age than it is to determine whether a criminal
defendant's "due process" rights have been violated. Consequently,

breathing substantive content into abstracted rights inevitably requires
judges to rely on factors external to the textual foundation of the right
itself.
Judicial balancing tests illustrate this phenomenon particularly well.

When judges engage in balancing tests, they necessarily define the
substantive content of a right in relation to the government's asserted

interest in constraining the scope of that right." That is, in fact, precisely
what a balancing test does: it defines the scope of the applicable right as
extending only to the point where it intersects with the government's
legitimate need to restrict it. 2 It is simply untenable in such a case to
maintain that the substantive content of the right itself can be defined
without reference to the strength of the government's asserted interest.
In campaign finance cases, that interest, as noted above, is the interest in
pursuing a particular vision of good government-a particular definition
of democracy. 3 Thus, when the Court rejects that interest as
insufficiently compelling, it has necessarily judged the legislature's
preferred definition of democracy and found it lacking.

This interdependency of rights and government reasons is to some
extent relatively uncontroversial.' Despite this, as Richard Fallon, Jr. has
noted, we nonetheless are often unable to quell the desire to speak of
rights as things-as objects that have independent, ascertainable,
51. Richard Fallon, Jr., citing balancing tests as an obvious, "banal" example, has argued that we
have no clear way of thinking about constitutional rights independent of governmental powers. Fallon,
supra note 14, at 344. Moreover, Fallon notes that "balancing" is not easily avoided in constitutional
law. Fallon notes that even as "self-consciously" rights-based a thinker as Ronald Dworkin must
ultimately acknowledge that the notions of individual rights and governmental powers are
conceptually interdependentin our constitutional scheme. Id. at 345. For a partial critique of Fallon's
approach, see Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L REV. 415, 415-16
(1993) (arguing that Fallon may be correct about the interdependency of rights and governmental
powers within the sphere of constitutional law, but that the concepts may nonetheless be severable in
the realm of general philosophical inquiry).
52. Fallon, supra note 14, at 360. The use of "tiered scrutiny" in some areas of First Amendment
law does not resolve this problem. A judicial determination that, for example, commercial or
pornographic speech should be subject to a lower level of scrutiny than political speech is merely an a
prioridetermination by the Court that the balancing scale should be tipped against the speech in these
cases. In other words, the categories invoked in tiered scrutiny merely represent a prior judicial
decision that certain categories of speech are of such little value, or that the government's interest in
restricting such speech is relatively high, that the balancing test should be weighted against protecting
the speech. The fact that this determination is enshrined in doctrinal language does not, however, alter
the nature of the underlying judicial decision itself.
53. Id. at 344.
54 Id.
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meaning that judges either protect or not-rather than as tools judges
use to balance competing values.5 This unquelled desire was apparent in
Buckley. The Court defined the scope of the First Amendment as
permitting legislative efforts to combat corruption, but prohibiting
legislative efforts to promote political equality. 6 Consequently, the scope
of the First Amendment itself was dictated by the Justices' own views
about what democracy should look like. But the Court in Buckley did not
acknowledge this. Instead, the Court couched its decision solely in the
language of rights protection. While the Court seemed tangentially aware
of the democracy-defining implications of its holding, it presented its
view of democracy as part of the right being defined ("limiting the liberty
of some to enhance the equality of others is completely foreign to the
First Amendment") rather than what it clearly was: a separate but
necessarily antecedent justification for defining the First Amendment
right that way in the first place.
D.

ACADEMIC SUPPORT FOR BUCKLEY

Academic supporters of Buckley, and opponents of campaign
finance regulation more generally, have taken this same approach.
Opponents of regulation routinely argue, following the Court's reasoning
in Buckley, that it is "the Constitution itself," not an underlying judicial
view of democracy, which renders (or should render) most campaign
finance regulations unconstitutional. 7 In fact, it is a recurring theme
among opponents of campaign finance regulation that it is the
proponents of regulation who are inappropriately asking judges to
constitutionalize a preferred definition of democracy." According to
these critics, judges who refuse to do so, and therefore reject as
insufficiently compelling legislative efforts to promote a particular view
of democracy, are not themselves relying on any preferred vision of
democracy.59 They are merely enforcing the constraints on legislative

55. Id at 372-74. Bruce Ackerman has categorized this approach to the Constitution and
constitutional
rights
as "rights
foundationalisrn"
Bruce
Ackerman,
Constitutional
Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE LJ. 453, 465-67 (1989). Rights foundationalists maintain that the
Constitution permits (in fact requires) judges to use constitutional rights to "trump" contrary
legislation. Id at 467. But rights foundationalists disagree on exactly what the substantive content of
those rights are. Id. They therefore must turn to political philosophy to define and cabin the scope of
the rights that are to trump ordinary legislation. Id. In campaign finance cases, as I argue here, that
requires judges to define the scope of First Amendment rights in reference to the judge's preferred
political philosophy: his or her definition of ideal democracy.
56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1996).
57. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L REV. 1045, I067 (1985) [hereinafter BeVier, Money and
Politics];Cain, Garrett'sTemptation, supra note 4; Sullivan, PoliticalMoney, supranote 13.
58. See, e.g., supranote 57.
59. See, e.g., supranote 57.
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discretion found in the Constitution itself.6°
Katherine Sullivan, a strong opponent of much campaign finance
regulation, has repeatedly made this argument. 6I Sullivan argues that the
problem with most campaign finance laws is that upholding them6
2
requires judges to endorse a "particular view of good government.
Bruce Cain and Lillian BeVier have made similar arguments. 63 Cain
accuses reform advocates of attempting to inappropriately
"constitutionalize" their view of democracy, 64 and BeVier argues that
upholding campaign finance regulations requires judges to endorse a
particular substantive vision of an "ideal political process." 6' This is
inappropriate, these scholars argue, because questions about what
"good" democracy is must be left to legislatures, subject only to
constitutional restrictions. 66
It is the "subject only to constitutional restrictions" part of this
analysis that is, as we have seen, problematic. This analysis, like the
analysis the Court used in Buckley, assumes that the judicial task of
protecting First Amendment rights is severable in campaign finance
cases from the non-judicial task of defining democracy. It assumes, in
other words, that the scope of the relevant right can be ascertained
without reliance on an underlying definition of democracy. But the
democracy-defining dilemma demonstrates that this is false: a court
cannot weigh the strength of the government's asserted interest in these
cases, and thereby cannot determine the scope of the First Amendment
right itself, without at least tacitly relying on some underlying definition
of democracy.
Jeremy Waldron has discussed this problem in his work. Waldron,
arguing against adoption of a fundamental rights document in Great
Britain, points out that disputes about democracy and political
disagreement often take the following form: "If people in society
disagree about anything, then a decision should be taken by majority
voting, provided individual rights are not violated thereby." 6&Waldron
then points out the fallacy of this approach. When the substantive scope
of a right itself is the subject of disagreement, then structuring the
disagreement as one of majoritarianism versus rights does nothing to
resolve the dispute. 68 People who disagree about the scope of the relevant

6o. See, e.g., supra note 57.
6i. See, e.g., Sullivan, PoliticalMoney, supra note 13, at 68o-8i.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 57.
64. Cain, Garrett'sTemptation, supra note 4, at 1602.
65. BeVier, Money and Politics,supra note 57, at 1067.
66. See supra note 57.
67. Waldron, supra note 5o, at 32.

68. Id.
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right will disagree about what this rights-based restriction requires. 69 As
noted above, this problem is particularly unavoidable when the rights
involved are stated at a high level of generality, such as "the freedom of
speech."
The persistence of this problem in campaign finance cases is in fact
evident within the position taken by scholars like Sullivan, Cain and
BeVier. Like most opponents of campaign finance regulation, these
writers accept the Court's finding that preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption, narrowly defined as quid pro quo type
exchanges, is constitutionally valid.' But why is this restriction justified
while others-such as those found in BCRA-are not? Certainly nothing
in the text of the First Amendment itself dictates such a distinction.7' Nor
does a generalized assertion that the logic of the First Amendment
requires that as little speech as possible be restricted.72 As we have seen,
the distinction being drawn here between the government's interest in
preventing quid pro quo-type corruption and the government's interest
in preventing other possible distortions of the political process can only
be driven by an underlying judicial belief that the vision of democracy
furthered by preventing quid pro quo corruption is valid while the vision
of democracy furthered by other ("unconstitutional") regulations is not.
This result would be supportable-it would not indicate an
inappropriate judicial choice between competing visions of democracyif the Constitution itself somehow "chooses" a substantive vision of
democracy. Opponents of campaign finance regulation, however, do not

6g Id For example, those who believe that the Fourteenth Amendment protects abortion rights
will argue that Congress should be able to regulate abortion, but only to the point where the protected
rights are violated, while those who disagree will argue that the majoritarian branches of government
should be able to regulate abortion as extentively as they wish. Thus, arguing that societal
disagreements should be resolved by majoritarian means "as longs as individual rights are protected"
does not in fact help resolve such disagreements at all.
70. See BeVier, Money and Politics, supra note 57, at IO82-89; Cain, Garrett's Temptation, supra
note 4, at i6o3; Sullivan, PoliticalMoney, supra note 13, at 678-79.
71. The full text of the First Amendment is: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
72. BeVier disagrees, and has most forcefully articulated this position. She has argued that
Buckley was correctly decided because the First Amendment requires that as little political speech as
possible be restricted. BeVier, Money and Politics,supra note 57, at 1053-54. This does not solve the
democracy-defining dilemma. As long as some political speech is to be restricted, then someone must
decide what speech will be restricted, and for what reasons. When those reasons are dependent on a
definition of democracy, as we have seen that they are in campaign finance cases, then this argument
amounts to nothing but an assertion that judges, not legislatures, should define democracy. But this is
a result that BeVier and other opponents of regulation vehemently reject. Id at IO89; see also Holder
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901-02 (i994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's vote dilution
cases require the federal courts to "dabble" in political theory and inappropriately force the Court to
choose among competing bases of representation and competing theories of political philosophy).
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rest their arguments on that assertion, and for good reason. The question
of whether the Constitution embodies a pluralist or civic republican (or
any other) definition of democracy has been exhaustively debated in the
academic literature.' That debate has been inconclusive. Neither civic
republicans nor pluralists are able to claim absolute constitutional
authority for their particular view of American democracy.
I do not rehash the substance of that debate here because it is, in a
way that is important to understand, ultimately beside my point. It is not
my goal to argue that one definition of democracy should or must
prevail. My goal is to illustrate that defining democracy is what the entire
debate is about. Simply asserting that regulating political speech to
further one view of democracy is constitutionally acceptable but
regulating political speech to further a different view of democracy is
unacceptable is not sufficient. Such an approach denies the democracydefining dilemma underlying these cases, and perpetuates the illusion
that it is an independently ascertainable definition of the relevant right
that is driving the result.
BCRA: THE BATTLE FOR "CORRUPTION"
The preceding section, using Buckley v. Valeo to illustrate the point,
demonstrated that the Supreme Court has been unable to define the
scope of First Amendment rights in campaign finance cases without
relying on a baseline definition of democracy. This is because the scope
of the First Amendment right in these cases will depend on the perceived
strength of the government's asserted need to regulate the speech at
issue. Judges cannot evaluate this need, and therefore cannot determine
the appropriate scope of the right, without having some baseline vision of
what democracy itself should look like.
In Buckley, we saw that the Court rejected the civic republican
vision of democracy endorsed by Congress and instead adopted and used
II. FROM

73. See, e.g.,

BUCKLEY TO

supra note 28 (arguing that the Constitution embraces pluralism); DAVID B.
(arguing that
the Constitution embraces pluralism); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST, 179-247
(i98I) (arguing that the Constitution embraces republicanism); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. t013 (1984) (arguing that pluralism is not the sole
political philosophy underlying the Constitution); Larry D. Kramer, Madison'sAudience, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 611, 613-16, 637-39, 665--68 (1999) (arguing that neither the pluralist nor the republican aspects
of Madison's Federalist were fully understood or accepted by his contemporaries and that Madison's
work therefore is an unreliable indicator of original intent); Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self
Government, 1oo HARV. L REV. 4 (t986) (arguing that the Constitution has republican underpinnings);
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 28 (using the writings of James Madison and
others to argue that the Constitution has substantial republican elements); Sunstein, Interest Groups,
supra note 28. For a historical analysis of the mixed political theories of the founding generation, see
DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITCAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1972).
DAHL,

TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951)
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as a baseline its own more pluralistic vision.74 In doing so, the Buckley
Court held that combating political corruption or the appearance of such
corruption was an important enough government interest to justify
restrictions on political speech, but that attempting to equalize the
political influence of citizens was not.7' Because of this holding, the
constitutionality of campaign finance regulations today turns on a
judicial determination of what "corrupts" the political process. This
focus on corruption, however, has not alleviated the Court's democracydefining dilemma; it has merely shifted the terms of the debate.
Corruption is hardly self-defining. 7 As Daniel Lowenstein has
noted, determining whether something constitutes "corruption" requires
a baseline from which to evaluate the effect of the allegedly corrupting
behavior."8 Consequently, in campaign finance cases, judges cannot
determine what corrupts the political process without a baseline
understanding of what an uncorrupted or "good" political process should
look like. Buckley's determination-that preventing corruption or the
appearance thereof is the only sufficiently compelling government

interest justifying restrictions on campaign financing -therefore merely
forces the democracy-defining dilemma into a new, corruption-based

terminology.
In this section, I illustrate how the post-Buckley task of defining
corruption has failed to disengage the Court from its democracy-defining
dilemma. I examine three of the Court's post-Buckley, pre-BCRA
decisions: FederalElection Commission v. National Conservative Political

74. See discussion of Buckley, supra Part I.
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 28-29, 48-49 (1996).
76. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
77. There is a great deal of literature addressing what constitutes "corruption" of the political
process. For a sampling of several different perspectives, see Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance
Reform Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLum. L. REV. 1258 (i994), Lowenstein, The
Root of All Evil, supra note 38; Mchelman, supra note 73, at 4o-4t (noting that to a civic republican,
corruption occurs when a citizen's commitment to the good faith pursuit of the common good is
broken or subverted); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1369 (I994). See also Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance
Reform, 1995 U. CmO. LEGAL F. i i i (arguing that the term "corruption" acts as a proxy for a more
foundational dispute about how political power should be distributed and to what extent equity
considerations can or should influence that question).
o
78. See Lowenstein, PoliticalBribery, supra note 3 , at 798-99 (discussing political bribery and
how the word "corruption" cannot be defined without reference to a normative standard). Lowenstein
demonstrates that the descriptive aspect of the word "corruption" cannot be separated from a
normative concept of some type of good. Id. at 802-03. In the political realm, that good is usually a
concept of the public interest. Id. Thus, the notion of "corruption" is used in the campaign finance
debate to indicate things that are contrary to the public interest, either because they are themselves
contrary to the public interest or because they lead to policy decisions contrary to the public interest.
Id. at 8o4. Lowenstein concludes that it is therefore necessary to turn to political theory and different
concepts of the public good to give content to the notion of political corruption. Id. at 8o5.
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Action Committee (NCPAC)79, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL)" and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.8 These cases
are among the Court's most important campaign finance decisions. They
reach substantively different results (NCPAC and MCFL strike down
campaign finance regulations, while Austin upholds a regulation), and
they each include strong dissents.82 Combined, they provide a good
opportunity to examine how Buckley's corruption-based paradigm has
not resolved, and may have more deeply disguised, the Court's
democracy-defining dilemma.
A.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Rehnquist, struck down a federal statute that limited independent
expenditures in support of a presidential candidate who had accepted
public financing. 83 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption was the only sufficiently
compelling
government
interest
justifying campaign-financing
regulations. 4 The Court also attempted in NCPAC to clarify the
definition of corruption set out in Bucke-. Corruption, the Court said, is
a "subversion of the political process. ,o This subversion occurs when
"elected officials are influenced to act contrary to the obligations of their
office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of
money into their campaigns. " 6 Consequently, according to the Court, the
hallmark of political corruption is the classic
political quid pro quo: the
87
exchange of dollars for legislative votes.
Supporters of the law challenged in NCPAC argued that
independent expenditures made by political action committees (like
NCPAC) posed an even greater threat of corruption than the quid pro
quo-type of exchange of campaign contributions for legislative favors
that concerned the Court in Buckley. 88 Their reasoning was that political
advertising by PACs can be so influential in elections that candidates and
elected officials will feel compelled to curry favor with PAC leaders by
79. Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
8o. Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
8I. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
82. Justice Rehnquist is the author of NCPAC. Justice Brennan authored MCFL, with Justice
Rehnquist in dissent. Austin was written by Justice Marshall, with Justice Scalia in dissent.
83. 470 U.S. at 497.
84. Id at 496-97.
85. Id
86. Id.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 497-98.
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voting in accordance with their wishes instead of the wishes of the
official's constituents. 89 The Court rejected this argument. It cannot be a
corruption of the political process, the Court said, when elected officials
change their positions on issues in response to political messages paid for
by others.' ° Quite to the contrary, the Court viewed this as exemplary
democratic conduct.9'
Consider the view of democracy required to reach this result. To the
NCPAC Court, democracy is about ensuring that elected officials are
responsive to the aggregate preferences of the public, as measured by the
level of electoral pressure an interest group can generate through its
political spending.92 Interfering with an elected official's incentives to
vote in accordance with those expressed preferences (quid pro quo-type
bribery) corrupts democracy, but wealth-based disparities in the ability
to shape those preferences in the first place, by making independent
expenditures, does not.' This is a fairly pluralistic vision of how
democracy should work.' But the Court, as in Buckley, does not
acknowledge that it is relying on a vision of democracy in reaching its
decision. Instead, it couches its decision purely in First Amendment
terms. The Court, balancing the challenger's claimed free speech
interests against the government's claimed interest in preventing
corruption, simply asserts that there is no significant risk of corruption in
PAC spending and that restricting the spending therefore is not
constitutionally justified.'
Justice White, dissenting, argues that the Court should use a more
deferential approach when determining the constitutionality of campaign
finance laws. He disagrees with the majority's empirical assumption that
a candidate would feel a greater temptation to exchange her legislative
votes for a large campaign contribution than for the promise (or threat)
of a large independent expenditure, but believes that such "close calls"
should be left to Congress.' The Court, he says, should give substantial
deference to congressional determinations about what poses a significant
threat to the "integrity and fairness" of the electoral process and what
does not. 8
Judicial deference of this sort can avoid one of the negative
consequences of the democracy-defining dilemma. Namely, in any given
89 Id. at 498.
9o. Id.
91. Id
92- See id.
93. Id. at 497.
94- See supra text accompanying notes 28-45.
95. Nat'l Conservative PoliticalAction Comn, 470 U.S. at 5oi.
96. Id at 509-1I (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 509 (White, J., dissenting).
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case, deference reduces the likelihood that courts will substitute their
own preferred visions of democracy for those preferred by the
legislature. Deference alone, however, does not resolve the democracydefining dilemma. Justice White's opinion illustrates this. Justice White
does not question the Court's basic approach to these cases; he just
disagrees with the majority's result in this case. Consequently, he
conducts his own type of balancing test. In doing so, he finds that
Congress's asserted interest-in ensuring that elections be held between
equally well-financed candidates in order to prevent election results from
turning on spending disparities between candidates-is reasonable, and
therefore is sufficiently compelling to override the plaintiffs' speech
interests.' Presumably, however, there is some point at which Justice
White would decide that the legislature's goals are no longer reasonable
and therefore no longer deserving of judicial deference." ° But because
Justice White continues to rely on the same rights-based, balancing
methodology used by the Court, his approach provides no guidance on
where that point is, or should be. Thus, deference alone cannot fully
manage the democracy-defining dilemma. '
Justice Marshall also dissents in NCPAC, arguing that the asserted
congressional interest in promoting "equal access" to the political arena
is sufficiently compelling to uphold limits on independent expenditures. °"
To Justice Marshall, democracy requires some degree of "equal access"
to the political process." While Justice Marshall did not elaborate on
precisely what he meant by this, he clearly envisioned a more republican,
participatory democracy than did Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion,
or even Justice White's dissent. Justice Marshall's opinion, therefore, is
as dependent as the majority's on an underlying vision of democracy, and
Justice Marshall simply agrees with the vision endorsed by Congress in
this case.

9L Id. at 517-18 (White, J., dissenting).
ioo. Justice White provides more information on where his baseline view of democracy is in his
opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 435 U.S. 765, 8o9 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
Writing in dissent, Justice White said that the state (Massachusetts, in that case) had a compelling
interest in preventing corporations, which have acquired their wealth through the corporate form,
from obtaining an "unfair" advantage in the political process ("The State need not allow its own
creation to consume it"). Id. Any such advantage would be unfair, he says, because it is disconnected
from support for the ideas expressed. Id. This reasoning is obviously similar to that used by Justice
Brennan in Fed Elections Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 104-126.
iot. In Part IV of this article, I sketch a new decision-making methodology that attempts to
address this problem.
102. Nat'l ConservativePoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. at 598 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
i03. Id. at 521 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION V. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE

In Federal Elections Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL), the Court was asked whether a non-profit, ideological
corporation could be prohibited from making political expenditures from
unsegregated corporate funds." Earlier cases had implied that such
restrictions might be constitutional when applied to regular commercial
corporations."° The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brennan,
struck down the restrictions as applied to MCFL."'
Working within the Court's corruption-based paradigm, the
government defended its statute by arguing that restrictions on corporate
political spending were necessary to protect the "integrity of the
market-place of political ideas" from "corruption" by corporate wealth."
The Court had accepted this reasoning in earlier cases. For example, in
Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, the
Court had upheld a statute prohibiting corporations from making direct
contributions to electoral candidates. '6'In that case, the Court accepted
the government's argument that there was a special need to regulate the
electoral impact of the "substantial aggregations" of wealth that
corporations can generate because of their "special advantages.""' The
logic underlying these cases, accepted by Justice Brennan in MCFL, was
that incorporation is a state-granted privilege that allows corporations to
accumulate wealth they otherwise would not be able to acquire."'
Consequently, this wealth, if left unregulated in the electoral realm,
could be "unfairly" translated into political power."'
This transference of corporate wealth into political power is
"unfair," Justice Brennan said, because the ability to earn (and therefore
spend) money through the corporate form does not in any way reflect the
degree of public support for the corporation's political agenda."2 The
ability of candidates and interest groups to engage in political spending,
the MCFL Court said, usually is a "rough barometer" of public support
104. 479 U.S.238, 241 (1986).

io5. In First National Bank v. Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law prohibiting
corporations from spending corporate funds to support or object to public referendums. 435 U.S.765,
795 (r978). In referendums, the Court held, there is no candidate to "corrupt" and corporate funds
therefore were merely contributing to the overall political debate. Id at 790. Because political speech
has the capacity for informing the public regardless of what the source of that speech is, there was
therefore no compelling state interest in prohibiting corporate speech involving referendums. Id at
790-92.
IO6. Mass. Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 241.
io7. Id. at 257.
108. 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982).
IO9. Id. at 207-08.
rio. Mass. Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 257.
iIi.
Id.
112. Id. at 258.
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for the political agenda pursued by the candidate or group spending the
money."3 But this is not the case with corporate wealth. With few
exceptions, people buy french fries because they like french fries, not
because they approve of (or are even aware of) McDonald's political
agenda. Consequently, the Court said, political spending by corporations
is different than political spending by candidates or political parties.
Unlike non-corporate entities, there is no logical link between the ability
of corporations to spend money and the level of public support for a
corporation's political platform."4 Corporate political spending therefore
could "corrupt" the political process by "distorting" public debate: by
decoupling the ability to engage in that debate from the level of public
support for the positions taken in it. "'
Applying this reasoning to the ideological, non-profit corporate
defendant in MCFL, however, the Court found no such possibility of
corruption-by-distortion. 6 Ideological corporations like MCFL, Justice
Brennan said, are formed for the very purpose of disseminating their
political ideas, and their supporters contribute to the ideological
corporation precisely because they support its political agenda."7 Thus,
the Court said, the ability of ideological non-profit corporations to
engage in political spending, unlike the ability of regular commercial
corporations to do so, does reflect popular support for the ideological
corporation's political agenda and therefore cannot unfairly distort
political debate."8
Justice Rehnquist dissented. The threat to the democratic process
presented by corporate spending will vary, Justice Rehnquist agreed,

113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id. Daniel Ortiz has noted that this reasoning evidences a different conception of citizen
voters than the Court's earlier decisions had. Ortiz has labeled these two competing visions of citizen
voters as the "civic smarty" and the "civic slob" approaches. See Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert,
supra note 38, at 4. The civic smarty approach views citizen voters as informed and engaged in political
debate. Under this view, voters will channel the political information they receive through their own
reasoning processes and will make intelligent political choices accordingly. At least some parts of the
Buckley decision appear to rest on this view of citizen voter, as does much of the academic opposition
to campaign finance reform. The "distortion" rationale, however, seems to rest on the "civic slob"
vision of citizen voters. Id. Under this view, voters are "passive and uniformed." They do not
deliberate or carefully reason through the political information they receive. Instead, they make
political decisions based on emotions, feelings, and unevaluated images and rhetoric. A civic smarty
could "separate the wheat from the chaff' (Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695
(i99o) (Scalia, J., dissenting)), while a civic slob would need to be protected from disproportionate and
therefore distorting political messages. Ortiz notes that while both opponents and proponents of
campaign finance regulation purport to view citizens as civic smarties, that image is in tension with
much of the pro-regulation agenda. Ortiz, The Engagedand the Inert,supranote 38, at 19-26.
II6. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 259-60.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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depending on the particular characteristics of a given corporation."9
Thus, "large and successful" corporations with vast resources to build a
"political war chest" will constitute a more potent threat to the political
process than less successful corporations or non-profit corporations.'2"
But drawing such distinctions, Justice Rehnquist argued, is a legislative
task, not a judicial one."' Consequently, in his opinion, the Court should
not interfere with the judgment of the Massachusetts legislature that
allowing MCFL to make political expenditures from unsegregated
corporate funds posed a significant risk of corruption to the political
process.
As in NCPAC, we see two different judicial approaches to the
question of what constitutes corruption of the political process. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion imposes a vigorous standard of review, while
Justice Rehnquist's dissent calls for judicial deference. But ultimately,
both decisions again rely on underlying visions of democracy. Justice
Brennan's opinion, using the devices of strict scrutiny and balancing,
finds that while corporate wealth usually can corrupt the political
process, the wealth amassed by an ideological group like MCFL cannot.
Corruption, to Justice Brennan, is defined here as not just things that
look like quid pro quo bribery, but also things that insert money into the
political process in a way that is unrelated to the level of public support
for the ideas the money is purchasing.'23 This definition of corruption
depends on a view of democracy in which political spending can corrupt
not just the legislative process (where legislative votes are cast) but also
the electoral process (where voter deliberation and decision-making
occurs).'" Restrictions on corporate spending, to Justice Brennan, are
usually justified by the government's compelling interest in protecting
the electoral realm by ensuring that competition among political actors in
that realm is "truly competition among ideas.' 2.5 But because there was
no such risk of distorting that process here, the rule applicable to regular
corporations could not be applied to MCFL 126 Thus, while regular
corporate spending can corrupt the political process by distorting

II9. Id. at 268 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist appears to have changed his mind on this
point. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 147-49 (2003) (opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, criticizing this reasoning).
12L Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 266, 268-69, 271 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 258.
124. Id. at 259-6o. See also Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert, supra note 38, at 26 n.9t. For a
thorough discussion of this shift in the definition of corruption, see Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Basic
Principles or Theoretical Tangles: Analyzing the Constitutionality of Government Regulation of
Campaign Finance, 38 CASE W. REs. L REv. 589,596-6o6 (1988).
125. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 259.
126. Id.
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electoral debate, spending by MCFL cannot because MCFL's ability to
make political expenditures, unlike that of commercial corporations, is
logically linked to public support for its political ideas. Both the general
rule and the exception here rely on the same underlying democratic
baseline: in an uncorrupted democratic system, political spending must at
least roughly correlate with popular support for the political ideas
purchased by that spending.
To see how embedded in democratic theory this holding is, contrast
this opinion with Buckley. Under the Court's reasoning in MCFL, the
desire to level the political playing field, at least to the extent that ideas
with equal public support receive equal public exposure, is a compelling
government interest justifying campaign finance regulations.'27 Yet
Buckley had seemed to hold that democracy did not require, and in fact
prohibited, the state from pursuing such equalitarian goals.' The MCFL
Court also rejects a vision of democracy, discussed below in regard to
Justice Scalia's dissent in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, as
an unregulated political marketplace in which citizens sort through a
barrage of political information and cull from it what they see fit.'29 In
contrast to this vision, the MCFL Court held that the government has a
valid and compelling role in regulating that market to ensure that
political spending has some correlation to popular support for the ideas
purchased by that spending.'30 In defining corruption this way, and
exempting MCFL's conduct from that definition, Justice Brennan's
majority opinion necessarily rejects both of these alternative viewsBuckley's and Justice Scalia's -of what constitutes a properly functioning
democracy.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, like Justice White's dissent in NCPAC,
calls for judicial deference to legislative decision-making in this area.'3'
Like Justice White's opinion, however, it nonetheless ultimately rests on
underlying ideas about what types of political processes democracy
requires or permits. In earlier decisions, Justice Rehnquist had found
that limitations on corporate spending of unsegregated corporate funds
were constitutional.'32 Yet, as the author of NCPAC and dissenter in
MCFL, he draws a constitutionally significant distinction between the
regulation of non-corporate spending (which should be subject to judicial
scrutiny) and the regulation of corporate spending (which should be left

127. Id. at 256-63.
128. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-53 (1976).
129. 494 U.S. 652, 695 (19o) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 256-59.
131. Id. at 266, 268-69, 271 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 269-7o (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fed. Elections
Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208--l1 (1982).
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to the legislature).'33 What drives this distinction? It seems to be Justice
Rehnquist's then-existing belief that corporate spending presents a risk
to the political process but that non-corporate spending does not.I" He
grounded this belief in the legal advantages of the corporate form that
allows corporations to accumulate wealth. 35' Consequently, Justice
Rehnquist's distinction necessarily rested on a vision of democracy that
finds some inequalities in political power-those derived from
differences in the way wealth is acquired-unacceptable., 6 Justice
Rehnquist's opinion here, like the MCFL majority's, therefore
necessarily relies on his preferred (albeit shifting) vision of democracy.
C.

AUSTIN V. MICHIGAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

The dispute over the definition of corruption underlying the Court's
reasoning in MCFL resurfaced in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce.37 In Austin, the Court was asked to decide directly the issue
raised indirectly in MCFL: does the Constitution permit a state to
regulate the independent expenditures of corporations in general
election campaigns? Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, over a
lively dissent by Justice Scalia, said yes.
Austin involved a Michigan statute prohibiting corporations from
making any independent political expenditures from unsegregated
corporate funds.' 3" Michigan defended its statute on the grounds
discussed so favorably by the Court in MCFL: the wealth of a
corporation is not connected to the level of public support for the
corporation's political ideas, so permitting that wealth to "unduly"
influence political debate would corrupt the political process.'39 The
Court agreed. Applying its familiar balancing test, the majority held that
the government's asserted interest in preventing this type of "undue
influence" over the political process was sufficiently compelling to
overcome the plaintiff's asserted free speech interests.'4" Thus, the Court
held that restrictions on the independent expenditures of corporations
133. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 266, 268-69, 271 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fed. Elections
Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500 (1985). The fact that Justice
Rehnquist appears to have changed his mind on this point actually supports the point I am making.
Obviously, it is Justice Rehnquist's underlying notions of what democracy requires that has changed,
not the First Amendment.
134. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 267-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 267, 270 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 266-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137- 494 U.S. 652 (I99O).
138. Id. at 654-55. Unsegregated funds are corporate funds that have not been raised or kept
separately from the general corporate treasury. Id.
i39, Id. at 658-59.
14o. Id. 659-60. For a discussion of the opposing notions of the citizen-voter evident in these cases,
see Ortiz's discussion of "civic smarties" and "civic slobs" in Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert, supra
note 38.
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were constitutionally justified.'4
The underlying democratic theory necessary to support this decision
is identical to that discussed above in relation to MCFL. What is new in
Austin, for our purposes, is Justice Scalia's dissent. Justice Scalia, in a
bristling dissent, criticized his colleagues for endorsing the principle that
"too much speech is an evil" subject to "correction" by the
government." The absolutely central principle of the First Amendment,
according to Justice Scalia, is that the government cannot be trusted to
ensure the "fairness" of political debate.'43 The majority opinion, he
maintained, violated that principle by holding that speech financed by
money generated in a particular way (through the corporate form) could
uniquely corrupt the political process.'"
Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority's reasoning is two-fold. First,
he says, the majority opinion proves too much.'45 If money spent on
political speech must roughly correlate with levels of public support for
the message contained in that speech, then not only corporate spending
but spending by any individual of above average wealth should be
prohibited. The majority's emphasis on the legal privileges granted by
the corporate form does not avoid this result, Justice Scalia argues,
because the law is instrumental in all aggregations of wealth, not just
wealth acquired by corporations.' 46 Second, and more pertinently, he
argues that what the majority views as excess corporate spending
disproportionate to public support for the corporation's ideas simply
cannot corrupt the political process."'4 Political corruption, to Justice
Scalia, entails quid pro quo-type exchanges of political favors for
campaign contributions, and nothing more. A regulatory system that
requires voters to find their own truth amidst uninhibited, unrestricted
political spending is not'4 only not corrupt, it is the ideal system in a free
and democratic society.
Justice Scalia couches his opinion entirely in the language of First
Amendment rights. It is the majority, not he, that is inappropriately
attempting to judicially define democracy.'49 But Justice Scalia is of
course doing exactly the same thing; he simply has a different view of
democracy than the majority. Justice Scalia engages in his own balancing
test. He weighs the government's asserted interest in prohibiting

141. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
142. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 68o-8i (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 679-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 68o-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 682-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14& Id. at 695 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I49. Id. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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corporate domination of political debate against the corporation's speech
interests, and finds the government's interest lacking. 5 ° In doing so, he
uses his preferred vision of democracy (as an unrestrained political
marketplace) to ascertain the scope of the First Amendment, and then
uses the First Amendment, so defined, to argue that his view of
democracy is constitutionally compelled. Thus, ,Justice Scalia, like the
majority, cannot define the scope of the First Amendment without first
referencing his preferred vision of what is good for democratic selfgovernment. Justice Scalia simply disagrees with the Michigan State
Legislature about what that is. 5'
III. MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION REVISITED
Having identified and examined the Court's democracy-defining
dilemma, we can consider the Court's McConnell v. Federal Elections
Commission decision in light of that dilemma. " McConnell involved a
challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act ("BCRA"). 53
BCRA includes two main provisions. The first of these provisions
prohibits political parties from raising or spending so-called "soft"
(unregulated) money.,' The second requires paid political advertising
that refers to a candidate for a federal election and is broadcast within
120 days of a general election or 6o days of a primary election to be paid
for with "hard" (regulated) money.'55 The McConnell majority, in an
opinion jointly authored by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, upheld both
of these provisions. 6 In doing so, the majority showed substantial
deference to congressional judgments regarding what types of political
spending can "corrupt" the political process.'57
The majority opinion began by acknowledging the definition of
150. 1& at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

151. Justice Scalia attempts to bolster the legitimacy of his preferred view of democracy by
invoking original intent. Id. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Founding Fathers, he says, would be
appalled by the majority's opinion. Id. This argument is similar to that posed by academic opponents
of campaign finance, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 66-71, and suffers from the same
failing. On its face, Justice Scalia's assertion that original intent requires the Court to adopt his vision
of democracy and not the legislature's is not an argument, it is just that: an assertion. It is not
supported by a single reference or footnote, other than a rather grandiloquent quote from Alexis de
Tocqueville. Id. at 693-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This failure to support his assertion is not surprising,
given the substantial and unresolved disagreement about what, if any, vision of democracy the
founding generation preferred, or intended to enshrine in the Constitution. See supranote 73.
152. 540 U.S. 93 (20o3).
153. Id. at 114.
154- Id. at 122-26. "Soft money" is money generally not subject to federal regulation. Id. Prior to
BCRA, federal law permitted unions, corporations, individuals, and groups who had already donated
the maximum amount of money permitted to federal candidates to make "soft money" donations to
state and local political parties. Id.
155. Id. at 161-62.
156. Id. at 188-89.
157. Id. at 154-58.
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corruption that Congress had endorsed in enacting BCRA."8 The statute,
the Court said, was designed to "purge national politics of what was
conceived to be the pernicious influence of big money campaign
contributions.""' 9 The Court then summarized the corruption-driven
Buckley paradigm, noting that the Buckley Court had upheld
contribution limits as sufficiently justified by Congress' interest in
preventing real or apparent corruption, but struck down expenditure
limits as not adequately supported by that interest. '6°
Next, the majority opinion articulated three "important
developments" in the campaign finance realm since Buckley: the
increased use of soft money contributions to gain access to federal
candidates; 6' the increased reliance on unregulated "issue advertising"
that was substantially identical to regulated express advocacy
advertising; I62 and a congressional determination that the use of soft
money and issue advertising had led to a "meltdown" of the entire
campaign regulatory scheme.'•3
The majority opinion then discussed the applicable standard of
review. The Court noted that limits on campaign contributions are
subject only to "closely drawn" (not strict) scrutiny.' 6, Citing Buckley, the
Court said that this reduced level of scrutiny is appropriate because
contribution limits, unlike expenditure limits, impose only marginal
restrictions on speech and are grounded in the important governmental
interest of preventing the corruption and the appearance of corruption
threatened by large financial contributions to political campaigns.' 65
Having set out these preliminary matters, Justices Stevens and
O'Connor then tackle the problem of defining "corruption." They reject
the dissenters' view that corruption can only encompass quid pro quotype exchanges of dollars for votes.' 66 The majority opinion notes that the
Court repeatedly has held that corruption includes not just quidpro quotype arrangements, but also reaches the "improper influence" and
"opportunities for abuse" possible when public officials are "too
compliant" with the wishes of large contributors." The majority opinion
158. Id. at 115-16.
I5. Id. (quoting United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567,572 (1957)).
i6o. Id. at 120-22.
16I. Id. at 122-26.
162. Id. at 126-29. The different treatment of these two types of ads stems from a footnote in
Buckley. In Buckley footnote 52, the Court, in narrowly construing the statute before it to avoid
vagueness problems, limited the statute to "express" advocacy, which it identified as communications
containing words such as "vote for," "elect," and "support." 424 U.S. 1,44 n.52 (1976).
163. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129-32.
164 Id. at 134-42.
165 . Id.
166. Id. at 143.
167. Id.
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describes that danger as the risk that elected officials might decide issues
based not on the "merits" of an issue itself or on the wishes of the elected
official's constituents, but "according to the wishes of those who have
made large financial contributions."' This possibility, the Court said, is
"just as troubling to a democracy" as quid pro quo arrangements.' 6 The
Court noted that the government has a compelling interest in preventing
the erosion of public confidence in the political system itself-what the
majority opinion called the 'cynical assumption that large donors call
the tune.""' 7 Having so defined the scope of corruption, the majority
held that it was reasonable for Congress to decide that the type of
conduct regulated by BCRA held as much of a risk of corruption (sodefined) as the types of conduct that the Court had in its earlier cases
permitted Congress to regulate or prohibit.'7'
The majority opinion seems correct in its argument that BCRA itself
does little more than embody a congressional determination that certain
legal distinctions-between the corrupting effect of large "soft" money
donations and the corrupting effect of large "hard" money donations;
and between advertisements that include the words "Vote for Smith"
and those that include the words "Call Smith and tell him how you feel
about this"-had become practically insupportable. If one accepts (as the
Court did in Buckley) that a $ioo,ooo donation solicited by a federal
candidate and distributed into her campaign account poses a risk of
political corruption, it is difficult to argue that Congress cannot
reasonably conclude that a $ioo,ooo donation solicited by a federal
candidate and distributed to her political party does also.
Thus, the vigorous dispute between the majority and the dissenters
in McConnell is perhaps driven less by the actual significance the Justices
attach to these particular distinctions than by the continuing
disagreement among the Justices about the meaning of political
corruption. As we have seen, however, that dispute is merely a proxy for
a deeper dispute about the best way to structure democracy itself. In
McConnell, as in the earlier cases we have examined, the Justices could
not agree on what corrupts the political process because they share no
common vision of what an uncorrupted process would look like. Thus,
the McConnell majority, in accepting the congressional determination
that the political system can be corrupted when elected officials give
"undue influence" to large financial donors-that is, when they decide
issues based on the wishes of financial backers instead of on "the
16& Id. at 153.
i69 Id.
170. Id. at I44 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,390 (2000)).
17L Id. at I53. The Court did note that "mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence
alone" will be insufficient to justify regulation, but that the record in this case established a much
greater problem. Id
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that its baseline definition of democracy was not

inconsistent with that embraced by Congress when it enacted BCRA. "
That definition, however, was inconsistent with Justice Scalia's
preferred vision of democracy. 74 Given the "premises of democracy,"
Justice Scalia said in dissent, "there is no such thing as too much
speech."' 75 As we have seen, this defines the First Amendment's

protection of speech at such a high level of abstraction that it provides no
independent guidance on how to decide actual cases.' 76 That difficulty is
readily apparent in Justice Scalia's dissent here. Despite the (apparently
self-evident) premise that in a democracy there is no such thing as too
much speech, Justice Scalia readily concedes that political speech can be
regulated, as it was in Buckley, to combat quid pro quo-type
corruption.'" To Justice Scalia, the regulations in BCRA are
distinguishable from those in Buckley because the increased access and
influence of political donors to elected officials targeted by BCRA
simply cannot be evidence of political corruption. These things are
instead just "the nature of politics."' 78 Therefore, Justice Scalia said, they
cannot "properly be considered corruption of the political process.""
Thus, Justice Scalia, echoing his Austin dissent, argues that the very

premise of the First Amendment is that citizens are "neither sheep nor
fools" and that government therefore can have little legitimate interest in

172. The dissenting Justices, particularly Justice Kennedy, accuse the majority of expanding the
Court's prior definition of corruption by including within that definition this notion of "undue
influence." Id at 293-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). It is difficult to see how.
Buckley held that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was a compelling
government interest justifying campaign contribution limits. In other words, Buckley held that
allowing elected officials to collect large amounts of money from financial backers created the
appearance or reality of political corruption. That holding makes little sense unless the Buckley Court
believed that large political contributions could inappropriately influence legislative behavior by
slanting that behavior in favor of the contributor. Thus, the Buckley rationale seems to be the same
rationale that underlies the McConnell majority's "undue influence" analysis.
173. Where the McConnell majority's baseline is may be signaled by the fact that, when discussing
how the Court previously has held that political corruption encapsulates more than quid pro quo-type
exchanges, the McConnell majority notably did not cite either MCFL or Austin See id at 143-44.
174. See id. at 257-59 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
175. Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
176. See text accompanying notes 67-69; see also Schauer & Pildes, supra note 19, at 1819.
177. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
178. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
179. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Throughout his opinion, Justice Scalia
questions congressional motives in enacting BCRA. His way of doing so is notably disrespectful to that
body. This is, unfortunately, consistent with what some scholars have identified as an increasing
tendency of this Court to show little regard for or courtesy to Congress as a coordinate branch of
government. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrineand the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L REv. 237, 240-41, 303, 310 (2oo2); Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, ioo MICH. L REv. 8o (2ooI); Pamela S. Karlan, supra
note 5o, at 1366.
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regulating political speech.' 8° But at no point does Justice Scalia explain
how that premise explains the constitutionally significant distinction he
draws between the campaign finance restrictions imposed by BCRA and
the campaign finance restrictions upheld in Buckley.' As in his Austin
dissent, he simply uses his baseline assumptions about the nature of
democracy to define the scope of the First Amendment, and then argues
that the First Amendment itself therefore requires his definition of
democracy. At no point does he explain why his preferred definition of
democracy is constitutionally compelled but other visions-including the
vision preferred by Congress in enacting BCRA-are constitutionally
prohibited. '8'

IV.

BEYOND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

I have thus far focused my discussion of the democracy-defining
dilemma on the Supreme Court's campaign finance cases. The dilemma,
however, extends beyond campaign finance cases into at least some other
election law cases. Two of the Court's most controversial election law
cases, California Democratic Party v. Jones and Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party illustrate this.
A.

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. JONES

In California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Court struck down
California's "blanket primary" law.'83 A blanket primary allows eligible
voters to vote in any party's primary and to vote in different party
primaries for different offices up for election at the same time (for
example, a voter could, on the same ballot, vote in the Democratic Party
gubernatorial primary and the Republican Attorney General primary).' 85
The blanket primary law was enacted by referendum in California.'
Public support for the law appeared to be driven in large part by a desire
to ensure that more moderate candidates emerged from the party
primaries.' The law was challenged by the Republican and Democratic
Parties, along with the Libertarian Party and the Peace and Freedom
87
Party, as a violation of their First Amendment associational rights.
The lower court held that although the parties' associational
18o. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
i8i. Id. at 258-59 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
182. Id
183. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
84 Id at 570.
185. Id
i86. Id
187. Id. at 571. Notably, neither major party made much effort to sway public opinion during the
referendum debate. The Republican Party spent $48,899 opposing the referendum and the Democratic
Party spent $4,630. Richard L Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 1oo CoLum. L. REV.
731, 747 (2000).
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interests were burdened, the burden was sufficiently justified by the
government's asserted interest in "enhanc[ing] the democratic nature of
the election process.!"1s California had claimed that its statute enhanced
the electoral process in two ways: by giving more voters (voters
unaffiliated with a political party) the ability to elect candidates of their
choice;' 9 and by ensuring an "effective" vote (defined as a vote that
contributes to the election of their preferred candidate) to citizens who
are in the minority party in a "safe district.""'9 California also asserted
additional interests in promoting electoral fairness and increasing voter
participation in elections. 9 ' The lower court accepted these interests as
sufficiently compelling.'92 In doing so, that court cited the testimony of
several political scientists predicting that the blanket primary would
increase voter participation, make elected officials responsive to greater
numbers of people, and reduce partisanship."9
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Scalia, writing for a 7-2
majority, rejected each of California's asserted interests as too
insufficient to justify the restrictions the statute imposed on the parties'
associational interests.'"' The Court held that California's interests in
giving more voters an opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choice,
and in increasing governmental responsiveness to citizens, were "simply
circumlocution" for an interest the Court found unacceptable: producing
different general election candidates than the parties themselves would
have chosen. 95 Giving minority voters in safe districts an increased
opportunity to cast a vote likely to result in the election of the candidate
of their choice was rejected on identical grounds.' 6 The majority opinion
also rejected out of hand California's other asserted interests. According
to the Court, promoting "fairness" was not a sufficiently compelling state
88. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1299 (E.D. Cal. I997), affd, 169 F.3d 646
(9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). The Court of Appeals adopted the district court opinion in
full and attached the decision as an appendix to its opinion. Throughout this discussion I cite to the
district court opinion as adopted by the 9th Circuit.
I89. Jones, 169 F.3d at 66o-6i. The state argued that other ways of conducting primary elections
resulted in extremist candidates being promoted to the general election, thereby restricting the
unaffiliated public at large to a choice between two candidates both of whom it found undesirable. Id.
i9o. A "safe district" in this context is an electoral district in which one party routinely wins by a
comfortable margin. Id. at 661; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-49 0986). Minority party voters,
therefore, have little chance to elect candidates from their preferred party.
191. Jones, i69 F.3d at 662.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 661-62.
194. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,572-86 (2ooo).
195. Id. at 582. The blanket primary referendum passed by a margin of 6o% to 4o%, and was
supported by 61 % of Democrats, 57% of Republicans, and 69% of Independents. Jones, i69 F.3d at
649. This reasoning raises the interesting question of just who (or what) "the party" is. For a discussion
of this issue, see Richard L. Hasen, Do the Peopleor the Parties Own the ElectoralProcess, 149 U. PA.
L. REv. 815, 818-i9 (2001).
196. Jones, 530 U.S. at 582-83.
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interest because political fairness is generally promoted by majority
rule," 7 and enhancing voter choice was an insufficiently compelling
government interest because voter choice is reduced, not enhanced, by a
the type of centrist candidates favored by a
system that produces
98
voters.'
of
majority
These are extraordinarily sweeping statements, containing broad
claims about what democracy should be. Reading the district court and
the Supreme Court opinions side by side, it is strikingly apparent that the
disagreement between the two courts rests on judicial disagreement
about exactly these claims-whether political fairness is protected by
majority rule, and whether voter choice is enhanced or reduced by
blanket primaries-and not on any independently ascertainable notion of
rights. Because the district court accepted the view that democratic selfgovernment should be something 'greater than competition between
political parties,"' the court accepted as compelling California's interest
in pursuing policies that furthered that view of democracy." The
Supreme Court, in rejecting California's asserted interests, also rejected
its vision of democracy. In doing so, it substituted its own preferred
vision of democracy, as requiring strict adherence to majority rule,
interest group based battles, and strong political parties, for the less
partisan-driven and less divisive vision preferred by the people of
California."°
B.

TIMMONS V. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party involved a First
Amendment challenge to Minnesota's "anti-fusion" law."°' Anti-fusion
laws prohibit so-called multi-party nominations-they prohibit the same
person from being listed on a ballot as a candidate for more than one
party.' In Timmons, a Minnesota State Representative wanted to
appear on the ballot as the candidate for both the Democratic Farmer-

197. Id.at 584.
198. Id. at 584-85.
i99. Jones, 169 F.3d at 66o (quoting Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992)).
200. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, recognized (and rejected) the democracy-defining
underpinnings of the majority's decision: "It is not this Court's constitutional function to choose
between the competing visions of what makes democracy work-party autonomy and discipline versus
progressive inclusion of the entire electorate in the process of selecting their public officials-that are
held by the litigants in this case. That choice belongs to the people." Jones, 530 U.S. at 598-99
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For a thorough discussion of the vision of democracy underlying the Supreme
Court's opinion, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L REV. 695 (2001)
[hereinafter Pildes, Democracy and Disorder].
201. 520 U.S. 351 (i997).
202 Id. at 353-54. Supporters of fusion candidates argue that they strengthen minor parties by
allowing voters to support minor party candidates without "wasting" their vote on a candidate unlikely
to win.
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Labor Party and the New Party." Both parties agreed to accept the joint
nomination, but, citing Minnesota's
anti-fusion law, local election
204
officials refused to permit it.
The New Party sued, posing its First Amendment association claim
in language very similar to that used by the Court in California
Democratic Party v. Jones.2" Anti-fusion laws, the New Party argued,

interfere with minor parties' association rights by preventing party
members from selecting the candidate of their choice.26 The New Party
also argued that allowing fusion candidates enhances democracy by
increasing the responsiveness of elected officials (by giving them more
information about why voters selected them), and by strengthening
minor parties (by allowing voters to support minor party candidates
without "wasting" their vote on a candidate unlikely to win)."° The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, and struck down the anti-fusion
statute.2cs The court relied on a vision of democracy that portrayed fusion
candidates in a positive, democracy-enhancing light: multiple party
nominations, the court said, invigorate self-government by "fostering
more competition,
participation, and representation in American
politics. ' ' "°
Again, the Supreme Court disagreed. In this case, the Court found
that the fusion ban was only minimally intrusive on the First Amendment
rights of political parties, and that Minnesota's asserted interest in
protecting the political process was compelling. ' Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, agreed with the plaintiffs that their First
Amendment associational interests were at issue, but held that the
burden imposed on those rights by the anti-fusion law was not
significant."I' The state's interests, however, were considered quite
important. Those interests-avoiding voter confusion, overcrowded
ballots, party splintering and disruptions of the two-party system-were
sufficiently compelling to the Court to justify restricting the plaintiffs'
First Amendment associational rights.1 2 States, the Court held, have a
bona fide interest in enacting election regulations that favor the
traditional two-party system and "temper the destabilizing effects of
party splintering and excessive factionalism." 213
Id. at 354.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 355; Jones, 530 U.S. at 571.
2o6. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359.
207. Id. at 355.
2o8. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d i96, 2oo (8th Cir. 1996).
2o9. Id. at 199; see also Pildes, Democracy and Disorder,supra note 200.
21o. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363-64.
211. Id. at 363.
o.
212. Id. at 364-7
213. Id. at 367.
203.

November 2004]

DEFINING DEMOCRACY

III

Compare this decision with Jones. In Jones, California's asserted
interest in increasing voter participation and making elected officials
more responsive to more people was insufficient to overcome the
political party plaintiffs' First Amendment associational interest in
selecting their own candidates.1 4 But in Timmons, Minnesota's interests
in avoiding voter confusion and protecting the two-party system were
2 '5
sufficiently compelling to justify intruding on that exact same interest.
I propose that many people would consider increasing voter
participation and governmental responsiveness to be as, or more
important state goals than avoiding whatever voter confusion is caused
by fusion candidacies. Troublingly, the disconnect between these two
cases is understandable only in light of the Court's reliance on an
unstated but necessary underlying vision of democracy. The Court simply
did not accept California's view of democracy, as less partisan and more
participatory, as legitimate. Minnesota's view of democracy, however,
which promoted rigorous competition between the two major parties,
was acceptable to the Court. Thus, in the judicial balancing act necessary
to resolve these cases, Minnesota's intrusion into party autonomy was
sufficiently compelling, but California's was not.
V. MANAGING THE DEMOCRACY-DEFINING DILEMMA IN JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING

We have seen that the dual tasks of defining rights and defining
democracy are, in campaign finance cases and perhaps in political
process cases more generally, inextricably interwoven. Thus, as I have
shown, judges charged with protecting rights in those cases cannot do so
without relying on underlying, judicially preferred definitions of
democracy. I have called this the courts' democracy-defining dilemma.
The judiciary's failure to recognize and manage this dilemma has had
several negative consequences. It has allowed important decisions to rest
on unstated and undefended assumptions about what democracy
requires, it has led to inconsistent and opaque judicial reasoning, and it
has deflected attention from what should be the important issue in these
cases: what, if any, visions of democratic self-government are
constitutionally compelled or constitutionally prohibited?
In this Part, I attempt to alleviate these negative consequences by
discussing how a court aware of the democracy-defining dilemma would
evaluate a campaign finance case. I propose a new decision-making
methodology, one designed to bring the democracy-defining dilemma
into the open, and to force judges to recognize and justify the democratic
preferences underlying their opinions. If they cannot do so, the new
214. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,582-84
o.
215. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369-7

(2000).
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methodology insists that judges respect the democracy-defining
preferences
of legislatures. Forcing
the democracy-defining
underpinnings of judicial reasoning in these cases into the forefront,
where they can be challenged and debated, will bring greater
transparency, clarity, and consistency to this body of law. Forcing judges
to stop substituting their visions of good government for those of
legislative bodies will create something most participants in the campaign
finance debate claim to want: more "room" for non-judicial participation
in defining democracy.

A.

NEW DECISION-MAKING METHODOLOGY

Under the current approach to campaign finance cases, judges
balance the legislature's asserted interest in regulating the speech at issue
against the speaker's claimed First Amendment rights.16 In most cases, as
we have seen, they do this without any explicit examination of either the
vision of democracy pursued by the legislature in enacting the challenged
law, or of the (often different) vision of democracy underlying the
judges' decision regarding how much weight to give the state's asserted
interest. This methodology is doubly flawed: it both hides the democracydefining implications of any judicial evaluation of the government's
asserted interest in these cases, and wrongly presumes that the scope of
the speaker's rights can be ascertained independently of that government
interest.
The first step of the new methodology, therefore, is to direct the
court's attention to the foundational issue in these cases: what definition
of democracy-what vision of good government-was the challenged
statute enacted to enhance or protect," 7 and is that vision constitutionally
permissible? Whether a particular vision of democracy is constitutionally
prohibited or protected, will, of course, be a deeply contested question."'
The purpose of the first part of the analysis therefore is simply to ensure
that this question is addressed openly and directly, rather than in the ad
hoc manner seen in the Court's existing cases. To accomplish this, the
analysis at this point must remain focused on the constitutional
permissibility of the legislatively preferred vision of democracy, without
regard to the purported substantive scope of the First Amendment.
216. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003); Jones, 530 U.S. at 567; Timmons, 520
U.S. at 351.
217. How a court should go about interpreting a statute is of course a contested issue. See, e.g.,
Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,
lo8 HARv. L. REV. 593 (995). This problem of statutory interpretation is not unique to my
methodology and I, therefore, do not address the issue here.
218. For a general discussion of methods of legal reasoning and constitutional interpretation, see
Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword"The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HAV. L REV. 26 (2000). As with the question of statutory interpretation, the debate regarding which
of these modes of legal reasoning is "correct" is beyond the scope of this article.
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Requiring a judge to identify and evaluate the validity of the legislature's
preferred vision of democracy before turning to the task of balancing the
respective interests of the state and the speaker will ensure that a judge
will not lightly or without justification substitute his or her own preferred
vision of democracy for that preferred by the legislature. Only by
requiring the court to consider the legislature's vision of democracy first,
before determining the weight to give to the state's interest in pursuing
that vision, can a court break out of the circular reasoning underlying the
traditional rights-based methodology. This step, therefore forces judges
to acknowledge their democracy-defining role-to call it by its proper
name-rather than allowing them to disguise that role in rights-based
rhetoric.
If, having undertaken this explicitly democracy-focused analysis, the
court determines that the view of democracy pursued by the legislature is
not itself constitutionally prohibited, the court should then accept that
pursuing the legislatively-preferred vision of democracy is a valid state
interest, and should evaluate the statute using that vision as the relevant
democracy-defining baseline. In doing so, the court should ask whether
the challenged legislation was sufficiently related to the legislature's goal
of enhancing or protecting its constitutionally acceptable definition of
democracy. The court also can at this point properly engage in its
traditional balancing of state and individual interests. The importance of
the state's interest in pursuing its preferred vision of democracy,
however, should not itself be questioned. The cognizant point here is that
the legitimacy of the legislative goal-to pursue a particular vision of
democracy-is confirmed once the court determines, under the first step
of the analysis, that the definition of democracy pursued by the
legislature is not constitutionally prohibited."9
This new methodology will, without question, reduce rights-based
judicial intervention in legislative regulation of the political process.
Recognition of the democracy-defining dilemma-that courts cannot
define or protect First Amendment rights in campaign finance cases
without relying on some baseline vision of what democracy itself should
be -forces a choice between granting judges or legislatures the power to
determine what that baseline is. Except in the presumably few cases
where independently definable constitutional constraints prohibit or
require a particular democratic vision, the new methodology elects to
2
leave that task with legislatures."
219. Legislatures enacting political process regulations will of course rarely have articulated-or
even contemplated-a comprehensive democratic vision underlying the regulations they enact. Such
regulations do, however, represent a legislative endorsement of a particular view of what constitutes
good self-government.
220. It is an over-generalization to respond to this point by arguing that the rights-based
constitutionalism of the United States legal system has already made this choice in favor of the
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METHODOLOGY

There are at least two potential criticisms of this approach both of
which I will address only briefly here. The first is that this analytical
methodology inappropriately forsakes the Constitution as a source of
democratic norms and ideals. The Constitution, this argument asserts,
has important things to say about the meaning of democracy. Restraining
judicial power to use the Constitution as a tool to define democracy
therefore diminishes the Constitution's role in this important debate.
This criticism certainly has merit: my new methodology will reduce the
court's influence, vis a vis the legislature, in defining our democracy. I
believe, however, that thinking of this as a criticism of the new
methodology evidences a misunderstanding of the lessons learned from
exposing the democracy-defining dilemma. The important question is not
whether the Constitution tells us anything more interesting about
democracy than, for example, that the president must be at least 35 years
old before he or she takes office. Of course it does: the Constitution
enshrines many values-liberty, freedom and equality-that help to
define our democratic values. But it tells us very little about how to
reduce these great abstractions into an operating system of government,
or, perhaps more importantly, how to integrate them when their many
possible interpretations collide. The relevant question therefore is not
whether the Constitution has anything to teach us about democracy, but
how aggressively judges should use their power of judicial review to give
substance to these abstractions in the face of legislative disagreement
about what democracy requires. If the values of liberty, freedom and
equality enshrined in the Constitution can be manifested through a
variety of political processes, none of which are clearly prohibited by the
Constitution, then perhaps judges should exercise their awesome power
of judicial review modestly, and without assuming, especially without
overt analysis, that their particular views of democracy are
constitutionally compelled.
The second potential argument against the new methodology is that
it simply makes the wrong choice in shifting most democracy-defining
decisions from judges to legislatures. Legislators, according to the likely
advocates of this position, are inherently self-interested and cannot be
trusted to define democracy because they will do so in ways that
perpetuate, or "lock-in," their own power. This argument is based in the
so-called "structuralist" approach to constitutional interpretation."'
judiciary. Rights-based review takes many forms in our system, ranging from non-justiciability
doctrines like the political question doctrine to the strictest application of strict scrutiny. I believe
there is more than sufficient space in this tradition for the methodology I develop here. For an
empirical discussion of how judicial review operates in our legal system, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993).
221. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politicsas Markets: PartisanLockups of the

November 2004]

DEFINING DEMOCRACY

Structuralism is a process-based theory that purports to eliminate rightsbased judicial balancing by moving the courts' focus away from
individual rights and toward the protection of so-called "structural"
values.22 Under structuralist reasoning, constitutional rights are not
"trumps" individuals hold against majoritarian power; they are instead
tools used by judges to ensure that government acts only for structurally
permissible reasons. 23
Pildes and Issacharoff have developed a particularized application of
the structuralist approach that they argue should be used in political
process cases.' That approach is the political competition model. Under
this view, "appropriate" democracy is, like a private market, robustly
competitive.2"5 As long as the political system is appropriately
competitive, judges should not use constitutional rights to unsettle the
decisions made in that system226 But, like a private market, the political
market is vulnerable to anti-competitive behavior. 7 In the political
market, this anti-competitive behavior manifests itself in legislative or
executive efforts to raise entry barriers against potential competitors.228 It
is this monopolistic (or dualopolistic) behavior that constitutional
principles prohibit.2 9 In political process cases, therefore, structuralists
argue that courts should shift their focus away from individual rights to
the competitive health of the underlying political market, and should use
their power to ensure that legislative bodies do not manipulate the
ground rules for their own benefit. 3
The difficulty with using structuralist reasoning as a response to the
democracy-defining dilemma is that structuralism does not-and does
not purport to-eliminate the need for judges to define democracy.23' At
a minimum, structuralism requires judges to define "good" democracy as
democracy that is appropriately competitive. 32 More pertinently,
determining whether a political system is appropriately competitive
DemocraticProcess,50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 644 (1998). Structuralism also owes an obvious intellectual
debt to the process-based rationale of the famous Carolene Productsfootnote 4. See United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
222. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HASnNGs LJ. 711, 713-14 (1994).
223.
224.

Id

225.

Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note
Id at 646.

226.

Id.

221.

Id.
Id.
229. Id
230. Id. at 648.
231. Structuralism also is subject to the first criticism rendered against my proposed methodology:
it largely removes the Constitution from the task of substantively defining democratic values. See
generally,HASEN, THE SuPREME COURT, supranote 9, at 143.
232. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, supra note 4, at 1602-03.
227.

228.
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requires judges to measure challenged legislation against some ideal
standard of what an electoral system should look like.233 But if, as posited
above, there are numerous visions of democracy that are constitutionally
acceptable, there is simply no way for a judge to do this without engaging
in the circular, democracy-defining reasoning discussed above. Every act
required or permitted in the political sphere that is not optimally
competitive restrains competition to some degree. It is not enough,
therefore, for a structuralist judge to determine if an act restrains
competition. He must decide if it restrains competition too much. But
how much is too much will inevitably depend on the judge's
understanding of what an optimally competitive system looks like.
Without such a baseline understanding, the judiciary cannot determine,
as Pildes says it must, if the challenged act is an impermissible "extreme
manifestation '2 3 of uncompetitiveness, or a less extreme, permissible
one. For example, to a republican-influenced supporter of campaign
finance regulation, a financing system that permits wealthy interests to
dominate political debate will look extremely uncompetitive; to a
pluralist opponent of regulation, it will not. Ultimately therefore, the
structuralist approach, like the Court's rights-based approach, requires a
baseline understanding of how democracy should be defined-an
understanding that I argue should be left, within the broad constitutional
limits discussed above -to the legislature.
CONCLUSION

In our legal system, the judiciary has been assigned the role of
defining and protecting the rights enumerated in the Constitution. But
the democracy-defining dilemma demonstrates that in some cases that
task cannot be separated from the deeper task of defining democracy.
Consequently, when engaging in their rights-protection role in these
cases, judges must make decisions about democracy. Courts have not,
however, acknowledged this. This failure to recognize and manage the
democracy-defining dilemma has resulted in a body of law that lacks
both transparency and doctrinal consistency. Moreover, it has embroiled
judges in the very task that many of them have expressly disavowed:
defining democracy.
The purpose of this Article has been to illuminate the democracydefining dilemma, and to begin constructing a way of managing it. The
new methodology I propose will reduce the power of judges to define
democracy, thereby permitting greater and more varied experimentation
with democratic schemes and creating more space for "we the people" to
participate in defining the democracy in which we live.
233. Id.
234. Pildes, PoliticalCompetition,supra note it, at
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